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1. Introduction  
 
In this chapter we analyze the politics of policing, with a specific focus on policing agendas in 
the two largest cities in The Netherlands: Amsterdam and Rotterdam. Both metropolises are 
considered metropolises facing ‘glocal’ challenges related to multicultural populations in 
urban areas, social inequalities in terms of household income, international harbors, crime and 
disorder. The term ‘glocal’ refers to the interlinkages between global challenges and local 
communities. In order to get an understanding of the tendencies towards divergence and 
convergence in urban policing in the metropolises under study we start with a summary of 
general trends in policing in the Netherlands in the second section. In the third section 
national, regional and local governmental constitutional arrangements, discretionary powers 
and public police management are presented. The remainder of the chapter compares and 
contrasts policing agendas in Amsterdam and Rotterdam and concludes with an overview of 
their regimes and possible explanations for convergence and divergence in the politics of 
policing in these metropolises. The search for the regimes in the background of policing 
agendas in these two embedded case studies reveals both convergence and divergence 
towards the national agenda and between the agendas in both metropolises. Possible 
explanations for these trends could be found in the political ‘circuits of power’ (Devroe, 
Edwards, Ponsaers, this volume) of the municipal ruling coalition and in wider institutional 
arrangements in place. 
 
2. Trends in the politics of contemporary policing in the Netherlands 
 
The Netherlands is a small country with approximately 17 million inhabitants in 2016. It 
contains a vital economy, a stable democratic system based on diplomacy, negotiation and 
consensus (Das, Huberts and Van Steden, 2007) and, until recently, a tolerant permissiveness 
towards many vices, foreigner-friendly and a tolerant penal climate. As in many other 
countries, tolerance changed after some critical events as explained below (Downes, et al 
2007). The Dutch policing and justice apparatus has traditionally been associated with 
pragmatism, tolerance and a sympathetic distaste for ‘anything which smacks of militarism’ 
(Wintle, 1996). This philosophy of policing, albeit altering signiﬁcantly, ﬁts well with the 
Dutch culture of consensus, equality and relative harmony (Andeweg and Irwin, 2002).  
 
For a long time, the Netherlands has known its own peculiar social structure which was 
developed in order to permit all groups to be different but equal (Spruyt, 2006). This social 
structure was characterized by ‘pillarization’1 and consisted of a four-fold, religiously inspired 
division between a protestant, a roman-catholic, a social democrat and a liberal pillar. The 
presence of an intermediate layer of ideologically based and pillarized organizations and 
institutions providing public resources for educational, social, cultural and even economic 
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purposes, became a salient feature of the Dutch welfare state in the course of the 20th century 
(Spiecker and Sleutel, 2001). This rather unique societal arrangement rapidly declined since 
the 1970s. The so-called ‘societal midﬁeld’2, constituted by the ensemble of pillarized 
associations and institutions was transformed (Spiecker and Sleutel, 2001)into a multi-ethnic 
society with significant consequences for the policing of crime and disorder.  
 
In the following sections we shed a light upon policing trends in The Netherlands in a 
chronological order. Following the arguments of Edwards and Hughes (2012) in order to 
capture shifts in national security agendas and implementation processes, we define policing 
in terms of policy agendas arranged around the concerns of justice (differentiated further 
between those of ‘criminal’, ‘restorative’ and ‘social’ justice) and of ‘risk management’. 
While these are not without their own limitations as sensitizing concepts, they translate well 
in cross-cultural comparative criminological research into policy agendas. Using these 
concepts it is possible to identify three main phases in the contemporary politics of policing in 
the Netherlands: in which prevention, risk management and law enforcement have been 
privileged.  
 
2.1 Policies aiming for prevention (1983-1993) 
 
Until the 1970s crime and disorder were not a national concern nor object of public policies in 
the Netherlands. This changed due to rising crime rates in the 1980s and the establishment of 
a Parliamentary Commission ‘Roethof’, named after its president (Commissie Kleine 
Criminaliteit, 1984). The committee identified a growing public concern with rising crime 
rates, a loss of trust in the government as protector of public and private interests, and the fear 
of a further erosion of norms and values within the population and in social control. The 
Roethof Commission argued the causes of crime were to be found in a weakened societal 
network of informal and formal control (Van Den Broeck, 2012) with the implication that 
external control had to be strengthened by formal and informal surveillance in public space 
(Jongman, 1988). Public programs were created and aimed at restoring and intensifying social 
ties and inclusion in Dutch neighborhoods (Van Dijk and De Waard, 2000).   
 
In the aftermath of this Commission, national government opted for an ‘integral security’ 
policy entailing the involvement and cooperation of new actors in the prevention of crime 
besides the police. A few years later the larger cities in the Netherlands created ‘Integral 
Security Policies’3 prioritizing incivilities and petty crime as policy priorities to be addressed 
by police in close collaboration with many partners from the public and private sectors. This 
led to a full grown policy tradition of local governments formulating and coordinating 
policing in close collaboration with many partners from the public, voluntary and private 
sectors (Cachet and Prins, 2012). The Netherlands were internationally known for their 
permissive policy4 towards crime and disorder. Political preferences to treat, for example, 
coffee shops selling cannabis and licensed prostitution permissively are widely known (Das et 
al, 2007). Moreover, ‘community safety’ and ‘crime prevention’ are called policies that seek 
to increase public safety oriented at the social context in which crime emerges rather than at 
the punishment of offenders themselves (Van Swaaningen, 2005), were the central concerns 
on which policing agendas were set during this period. Police ofﬁcers were dedicated to 
lowering crime rates and enhancing (subjective) safety within a social justice framework.  
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2.2 Towards a risk management approach (1994-2010) 
 
From the mid-1990s onwards the number of non-western second generation inhabitants grew 
by 62% to become almost 1.5 million (Spiecker & Sleutel, 2001). The biggest ethnic groups 
in the Netherlands were the Surinamese, Moroccan, Turkish, Moluccan, and Chinese 
communities, but lately the inﬂux of (political) refugees, in particular from countries in the 
Middle East and Africa, has increased drastically. This large-scale arrival of people from non-
western countries created substantial demographic changes in the Netherlands (ibid). The 
preventative approach, not leading to a visible decrease of crime numbers combined with 
popular concerns over this immigration, have been acknowledged as key factors in the 
transformation of the policy agenda , from a preventive and social policy-orientation towards 
a preoccupation with identifying and controlling particular groups and behaviours thought to 
threaten the ‘quality of life’ in Dutch cities. This period is called ‘risk management’ because a 
narrative of risks and risk analysis was used to conceptualize problematic groups and 
behaviours for the purposes of their control (Terpstra, 2010).  
 
It is argued that public feelings of insecurity and anxiety grew as many social problems were 
interpreted in terms of ethnic diversity and issues of urban security occupied a more 
prominent place in both national and local politics. Public debates about nuisance, youth 
gangs, terrorism and the misuse of social benefits became racialized (Van Swaaningen, 2005). 
The White Papers ‘Security Policy5’ (1995-1998) and the ‘Integral Security Program’ (1999)6 
launched debates on administrative sanctioning for offences and incivilities (Mein 2005; 
Sackers, 2010). The papers called for more surveillance in the streets, more prison cells and 
more competences for the police (Devroe, 2012). Police capacity increased and wardens 
entered public space reflecting a broader trend in which, it is argued, western societies were 
increasingly being  ‘governed through crime’ (Simon, 2007; Tonry, 2001). The urgency of 
tackling incivilities was thus strongly connected with public worries about immigration, 
ethnic minorities, and youngsters gathering in groups in public spaces. From 2000 onwards, 
politicians became increasingly critical of the police for inadequately fulfilling their duties for 
investigating crime and maintaining public order. This insight led to the establishment of 
supra-regional investigation teams and performance contracts with a strong focus on 
remittance-notes and the performance management of detective work (Devroe, 2013).  
 
In 2002 the right-wing politician Pim Fortuyn claimed to lead, ‘The Party of Law and Order’ 
(Leefbaar Rotterdam), coining the term ‘liveability’7 as a buzzword on the political agenda 
(Van Swaaningen, 2005). His White Paper, ‘Tackling Crime’ (2001) argued for stricter and 
more severe controls on behaviour in public spaces. The notion of prevention through social 
justice diminished as greater emphasis was placed on a more repressive orientation to the 
maintenance of public order and an emphasis on criminal law enforcement. This can be called 
a focus event in turning the Dutch tolerance towards more punitive policing. After the 
shocking assassination of Pim Fortuyn during the national election campaign on 6 May 2002, 
‘governing urban security’ became a highly politicized issue in the Netherlands (Den Boer, 
2007). After the murder, Fortuyn’s party (LPF) gained seats in national parliament and 
entered the ruling coalition ‘Balkenende I8’. LPF became part of the coalition with the 
                                                          
5 Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken, Nota Veiligheidsbeleid 1995-1998, Kamerstukken 1994-1995, 24 225, nrs. 
1 en 2.  
6 Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken (1999). Integraal veiligheidsprogramma, Kamerstukken 1998-1999, 26 
604, nr. 1.  
7 In Dutch: Leefbaarheid 
8 This Minister President led 4 governmental periods (Balkenende 1,2,3 and 4) until he resigned in 2007.  
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Christian Democrats (CDA) and the Liberal Party (VVD). Jan Peter Balkenende (CDA) 
became prime minister and formalized one single policy document before the Cabinet 
collapsed due to internal conflicts after just 87 days in office. This policy was titled ‘Towards 
a safer society’9 and introduced the idea of administrative orders providing Mayors with an 
instrument to sanction infringements on general police regulations (municipal code of 
prohibitions of certain behavior). This policy resembled some core ideas of Pim Fortuyn by 
prioritizing crime ﬁghting, attention for maintaining public norms and values, more legal 
competences for the police and various incentives for police performance indicators. 
 
The Dutch general elections in 2003 resulted in the cabinet Balkenende II, a coalition 
agreement with the CDA, VVD and Liberal Democrats party D66. One year later, the country 
was shocked again by the murder of art and ﬁlm director Theo van Gogh (2004). Van Gogh 
launched a critical movie about Islam and was murdered by a radicalized Muslim three 
months later. The murder triggered a public debate on tolerance of religion and minorities in 
the Netherlands. Especially for Amsterdam, this was an important event, as it increased an 
‘us-against-them’ mentality in the city (Verbeek, 2006). Since then, tensions in the city were 
increasing as radicalization had become much more visible (Verbeek, 2006). In the summer of 
2006 the cabinet collapsed again followed by the new cabinet Balkenende IV. In these 
turbulent times, the policy ‘Towards a Safer Society’ remained the national security 
framework in the Netherlands until 2007. This policy called for a more repressive approach 
and a striking detail is that the word ‘prevention’ was completely absent in this document 
(Terpstra, 2007).  
 
In 2009 the ‘Act on Administrative Orders in Public Space’ was passed empowering local 
governments to sanction infringements on behavior inserted in the ‘Local Municipal Code’ 
(mostly incivilities) by imposing fines (Mevis, 2004). The public police as well as wardens 
can report and sanction by means of fines labeled as ‘administrative punishment’10. 
Meanwhile the Ministry of Justice’s budget rose sensationally with injections of 70 million in 
2003 and an expected 200 million in 2008 whilst police numbers grew from 40,000 to 50,000 
ofﬁcers in less than ten years (Das et al, 2001). During this period criminal justice was 
prioritised and the previous social prevention agenda marginalised (Pakes, 2005). 
 
2.3 Law enforcement (2010- 2016) 
 
This repressive agenda was further emphasized in the ‘Law on Incivilities and Measures 
Against Football Hooliganism’ (2010), which provides Dutch Mayors with an extra set of 
tools against disorderly behavior and incivilities in the cities. Mayors can, for example, 
impose a territorial ban11, a group ban12 or a ban on particular individuals with disorderly 
behaviour restricting their freedom of movement in particular places.  
 
In 2010, a ‘minority coalition’ was formed consisting of the Liberal Party (VVD) and the 
Christian Democrats (CDA) led by prime Minister Mark Rutte in order to block the ‘Party for 
Freedom’ led by Geert Wilders who gained 24 out of 150 seats in national parliament. This 
party criticized the ‘Islamification’ of Dutch society and emphasised the law enforcement 
purposes of policing towards. Wilders advocated ending immigration from Muslim countries 
                                                          
9 ‘Towards a safer society’, White Paper period 2002-2006 (Ministry of Justice and Ministry of Interior Affairs, 
2002.  
10 In Dutch: Bestuurlijke strafbeschikking 
11 In Dutch: gebiedsverbod 
12 In Dutch: groepsverbod 
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and supported banning the construction of new mosques and called for a hard line against 
what he called the ‘street terror’ exerted by minorities in Dutch cities. The electoral success of 
his populist party is thought to have shifted the policing agenda further away from the 
preventive approach that prevailed post-Roethof and towards an enforcement agenda. 
 
The Christian Democrats (CDA) and the Liberals (VVD) formed a minority coalition as they 
did not want to rule with the PVV because of their different views on Islam and immigration. 
However as this coalition had a minority of seats in parliament they tried to negotiate with the 
PVV in order to be able to pass major reductions in public expenditure, worth millions of 
euros, in the context of the economic downturn that had followed the global financial crisis of 
2008 The negotiations failed and new elections were called in 2012. This time cabinet Rutte II 
was formed and consisted of a coalition between the Liberal Party (VVD) and the Labor Party 
(PvdA). Their governmental agreement ‘Building Bridges’ (2012-2016) supplied an extra 105 
million Euros for  the police each year, in order to have, ‘more blue on the streets and more 
capacity for investigation13’ while a substantial budget cut was proposed for welfare, social 
insurance and civil service budgets.  
 
Furthermore, debates about policing in the Netherlands in this period were also dominated by 
reorganization of the Dutch police force from a regional to a national system. The Police 
Reform Act (2012) was proposed and installed by Minister of Security and Justice and former 
Mayor of Rotterdam Ivo Opstelten. This new national police organization now shares the 
responsibility for setting policing agendas with local authorities and is consequently a 
significant factor in the evolving politics of metropolitan policing in the Netherlands (see 
section 2, below). The national agenda 2011-2014 prioritized high impact crimes such as 
burglaries and street robberies, youth gangs, organized crimes such as human trafficking, 
drugs trade and money laundering, animal abuse, cybercrime, environmental crime, illegal 
migrants, and urban safety on street level14. 
 
3. Governmental and constitutional arrangements 
 
The Dutch system of public administration consists of three layers of government: national 
government, regional provinces and local governments in almost 400 municipalities. 
Priorities, strategies and practices for urban policing in the Netherlands are heavily influenced 
by the circuits of power between this complex set of actors and their policing mandates.   
 
At the national level, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Ministry of Justice were both 
responsible for internal security and criminal justice until 2010 when the new Ministry of 
Security and Justice integrated both tasks in one department. General crime policies are 
developed at the national level while community and citizen-based policing is negotiated at 
the local and regional level reflecting the Dutch tradition of legitimating policing policy 
through consultation and negotiation in localities (Tops, 1994). Local governments have 
formal responsibility for public safety within municipal boundaries, and this has been the case 
ever since the first Local Government Act in 1851. Local governments consist of three 
independent bodies: the Mayor, having legal responsibility for public order and public safety 
within municipal boundaries15, the City Council and the Board of Mayor and Aldermen. It is 
                                                          
13 Coalition Agreement VVD – PvdA ‘Building bridges’ (Bruggen slaan), Regeerakkoord VVD - PvdA - 29 
oktober 2012. 
14 https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/actueel/nieuws/2011/02/18/landelijke-prioriteiten-politie-voor-een-veiliger-
nederland (last consulted on April 4th 2016)  
15 This has been set up in the first Local Government Act of 1851  
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the Mayor’s individual responsibility to safeguard local order16. In order to do so, Dutch 
Mayors may give orders to the police17 and have been granted various powers to address 
specific threats to urban security over the past twenty years (Prins, 2014). Mayors of Dutch 
municipalities are not directly elected but are appointed by the Crown for a six year term18, 
and are not consequently subject to the direct popular-democratic pressures that Belgian 
Mayors (Devroe, 2013) or the Police Crime Commissioners in England and Wales are (Jones 
and Lister, 2015). Dutch Mayors apply for their position by responding to an official vacancy 
published by the Minister of Interior Affairs. Once the Commissioner of the King selects them 
as a potential candidate they to go through a formal procedure including interviews with a 
selection of Council members and finally appointment by the King19. Mayors are supposed to 
‘stand above’ politics and guard the quality and outcome of local political- and policy 
processes. Although they are usually affiliated with a political party, their job is not to be a 
politician but a professional administrator.  
 
The Dutch police system20 was, until recently, characterized by two types of dualism: a 
distinction between administrative policing (maintenance of public order and public safety) 
and law enforcement on the one hand and between authority21 and control22 on the other 
(Cachet, Van Sluis et al. 2009, Fijnaut, 2012, Naeye, 2014). Authority refers to the ability to 
order police personnel to deploy a task in a specific area (operational policy). Control refers to 
taking care of the overarching organizational and financial aspects of the police organization 
(organizational management). Control of the Dutch police has for the most part been in the 
hands of the national government, who kept the budgets and capacity division in their 
portfolio (Fyfe, Terpstra and Tops, 2013). When it came to the local level the police had two 
managers. Both the Mayors and the Public Prosecutor were able to instruct the police on 
operational matters as well as influence some aspects of control. The Mayor had the authority 
and some control on police personnel maintaining public order and safety (administrative 
policing). The Public Prosecutor held authority and some control over the criminal 
investigation activities carried out by the police (law enforcement). These matters were 
negotiated and harmonized as much as possible in the triangle concertation between the 
Mayor, the Public Prosecutor and the Police Constable. However, the balance of powers over 
policing changed in 2012 when the national police system was introduced in the Netherlands. 
The critical implication of this being the abolition of the power of all mayors, in particular the 
25 regional mayors, to exercise control over local police work (they remained authority)  
 
This implies that Dutch Mayors nowadays only have the ability to order police personnel to 
deploy a task in a specific local area (authority) and lost their influence on the overarching 
organizational and financial aspects of the police organization (control). As Mayors have the 
statutory responsibility for local order and public safety they still hold a degree of discretion 
in setting local policy agendas. The Minister of Security and Justice is seeking convergence 
                                                          
16 Local Government Act, section 172 
17 Police Act, 2012, section 11.2 
18 The appointment procedure in the Netherlands is a long debated matter. In the early 2000s some political 
parties regarded the procedure as undemocratic and proposed a more direct election of the Mayor either directly 
by the people or by the City Council. A constitutional change to allow this failed to pass the Senate in March 
2005. Recently this matter has become a topic of political debate again as parliament,took the first legal step 
towards a potential change in the constitutional law describing the procedure for appointingDutch Mayors.  
19 https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/onderwerpen/gemeenten/inhoud/burgemeesters/benoeming-vacatures-en-ontslag 
(Last consulted on 6th of April 2016).  
20 For an in depth understanding of the Dutch police system, we refer to Devroe, et al (this volume). 
21 In Dutch: Gezag 
22 In Dutch: Beheer 
7 
 
between national policing priorities, as stipulated in the national security plan, and local 
policing priorities, as stipulated in  local and regional security plans (Devroe and Ponsaers, 
2013). However, this collaboration between local governments and the national police is 
subject of change as decisions about police core business have been shifted upwards to 
national level during the current reorganization of the Dutch police system.  
The shift towards centralization grants the constitutional-legal authority to control all aspects 
of police work to the Minister of Security and Justice which has, in turn, provoked 
considerable controversy. Commentators have heavily criticized the new power balance 
between the minister and national police chief on the one hand and the increasingly limited 
power for mayors to steer local police work on the other (Terpstra & Moor, 2012; Terpstra, et 
al, 2015; Cachet, 2015). They have argued that the consequence of the reform will be to push 
Dutch policing further away from involvement in preventive strategies in local neighborhoods 
and maintaining public order and safety (administrative policing)23 and  towards law 
enforcement using a rather crime fighting style of policing (like in France) instead of the 
former community oriented policing style.  
 
As a consequence of this constitutional arrangement policy agendas for policing in 
Amsterdam and Rotterdam are the outcomes of a negotiation between many stakeholders with 
potentially rival mandates, including Mayors and other local administrative bodies, the 
national Minister of Security and Justice, the national Police Chief and the regional Public 
Prosecutors. Variegation in the policing agendas pursued in different cities can be understood 
as the outcome of these negotiation processes. In the remainder of this chapter this variegation 
is illustrated through reference to contemporary policing agendas in Amsterdam and 
Rotterdam. In the next section we will shortly expand on the methodological design for 
analyzing those agendas. 
  
4. Research questions and methods 
 
The first parts of this chapter illustrated various phases in policing in the Netherlands as 
affected by the political landscape in the Netherlands and the constitutional setting of the 
police. Policing in metropolises will, by necessity, be subjected to these national spheres of 
influence. In the remainder of the paper the contemporary policing agendas in Amsterdam and 
Rotterdam will be illustrated and compared. The key question for comparative research to be 
answered is: What are the general policing regimes in Amsterdam and Rotterdam, to what 
extent do agendas for urban policing diverge or converge between the two metropoles and 
how might tensions towards convergence and divergence on both local and national level be 
explained? The following part will present an analysis of the agendas for public policing in 
Amsterdam and Rotterdam during the past 6 years. The next sections present the findings of a 
qualitative analysis of policy agendas combined with academic studies on policing in 
Amsterdam and Rotterdam. The focus of the analysis is on the formulation of the policing 
agenda and limits the empirical findings to ‘stated’ goals (Kickert, 2002). Nevertheless this 
allows us to unravel the policy agendas in an attempt to differentiate sub-national from 
national variation (Edwards and Prins 2014; Recasens i Brunet and Ponsaers 2014). Our 
analysis is based on Coalition Plans in which the Board of Mayor and Aldermen announces 
their overall plans for the city for the coming years (Amsterdam and Rotterdam) and related 
                                                          
23 To be clear, ‘administrative policing’ in this context means the maintenance of public order (as contrasted with 
the enforcement of the criminal law 
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security plans available at city level24.  For Amsterdam the Coalition Plan for Amsterdam city 
and the Regional Security Plan (covering 6 municipalities of which Amsterdam is the largest) 
was studied. This secondary source analysis was complemented with in-depth interviews with 
local representatives and police commissioners in Amsterdam. The city of Rotterdam works 
with Five Year Action Plans in which priorities and strategies for public policing on city level 
are announced. These were the main source for the analysis of this metropolis.  
 
5. Urban Policing in Amsterdam 
 
Amsterdam is the country’s capital and largest city located in the Western part of the 
Netherlands. Economically, Amsterdam has grown significantly since the expansion of its 
harbor in the past couple of decades and the ever increasing importance of Amsterdam’s 
Airport, Schiphol. Tourism in the city was at a peak in 2013 as Amsterdam hosted over six 
million tourists, the largest number ever recorded25. Amsterdam is known as one of the most 
diverse metropolises in the world, which is reflected in its demographics.  
 
In 2015 Amsterdam counted 821,752 inhabitants, while the greater metropolitan area of 
Amsterdam has approximately 2.388.318 inhabitants (Bureau O + S, 2015). Amsterdam is a 
fast growing city and it is expected that the population of the region will strongly increase in 
the coming years, due to the birth rate, further urbanization and the expected influx of 
migrants (Metropool Regio Amsterdam, 2016). More than half (51.1%) inhabitants have a 
non-Dutch background. Within this rate 16.4% have a European non-Dutch background and 
34.7% a non-European one26. Most non-Western inhabitants are concentrated in particular 
districts, such as Amsterdam-North, Amsterdam Bijlmer and Zeeburg (WPR, 2016). 
Compared to other cities in the Netherlands, Amsterdam has relatively more ethnic minorities 
and over 174 different nationalities (de Poot & Meershoek, 2014). The colonial independence 
of Indonesia and Suriname triggered a large number of Indonesians and Surinamese 
individuals to move to Amsterdam. In the 1960’s many from Italy, Morocco, Spain and 
Turkey emigrated to Amsterdam as guest workers. Furthermore, many (illegal) immigrants 
have come from Asian, European, American and African countries (WPR, 2016). The 
metropolis counts 176 different nationalities, which brands it as one of the most ethnically 
diverse capital cities in the world (WPR, 2016). This diverse demography helps to explain the 
development of policing strategy in the city. 
 
There has been little government support for the social integration of this increasingly diverse 
city other than the recruitment of some Moroccan, Turkish and Surinamese social workers, 
who had the task to integrate foreign newcomers in the city (Vermeulen, 2008). Another 
interesting observation is the relatively young population of Amsterdam. Half of its 
population is younger than 35 years old, almost a quarter is between the age of 15 and 29 (De 
Poot & Meershoek, 2014). Amsterdam ranks fifth in the list of the strongest economic 
metropolises inEurope  and is ranked eleventh on Mercer’s most habitable metropolises (van 
Gent, Musterd & Veldhuizen, 2014). In terms of income distribution, 51.8% of Amsterdam 
inhabitants receive a low income, 32% a medium income, while only 16.2% obtain a high 
income in 201327 (Burgers & Van der Waal, 2007).  
                                                          
24 In Rotterdam the Security Plan contains solely the metropolis itself. In Amsterdam the Security Plain covers 
the metropolis is Amsterdam as well as 5 other (smaller) municipalities.  
25 http://www.ois.amsterdam.nl/media/Amsterdam%20in%20cijfers%202014/#21/z (Last consulted on April 4th 
2016) 
26 http://statline.cbs.nl/Statweb/publication/?DM=SLNLandPA=70072NEDandD1=0-
88andD2=126andD3=landVW=T (Last consulted on April 4th 2016)  
27 https://www.ois.amsterdam.nl/feiten-en-cijfers/ (Last consulted on April 4th 2016) 
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Before the police reform in 2013 Amsterdam region covered the same municipalities and was 
divided in five parts: North, South, East, West, and the City Centre of Amsterdam. Since the 
reorganization, the new police unit has been split into only four districts, roughly 
geographically located in the North-West, North-East, South-West, and South-Eastern parts of 
Amsterdam. Each of those districts is furthermore divided in ‘robust basic teams’, operating 
only within a specific (broad) geographical area. The Regional Safety Plan labels 5450 
officers for the regional police unit of Amsterdam, and 215 as community officers, for the 
districts Center-North, East, South, and West (Regionaal Veiligheidsplan 2015-2018, 2014). 
The local police officers are expected to spend 80% of their time with their assigned districts. 
According to a news item of the Amsterdam police in 2015, community officers of 
Amsterdam are very focused on their core tasks like communication with the citizen 
compared to community officers in other cities in the Netherlands (politie.nl. 2015). 
Amsterdam policing has always been one of integral approach (Hulsebosch, et al, 2008) 
where different actors both in law enforcement and outside law enforcement (health care, 
education, housing) have worked together in project in order to decrease crime and social 
disorder.  
 
5.1 Local Politics and Administration 
 
The City Council is the highest governmental body in each metropolis in the Netherlands. 
Every four years municipal elections are held and local parties compete for the available 45 
seats. This body controls the main policing directions set out by the Board of Mayor and 
Aldermen who create local security policies and steer policing on a daily basis. Amsterdam 
was for 65 years dominated by the Dutch Labor Party (PvdA), the Labor party striving for a 
‘strong and social country’. Following a ghastly election season on both the local and national 
elections in 2014  the Labor Party in Amsterdam was overtaken by the ‘Liberal Democrats 
(‘D66’). From 2001 until 2010 Job Cohen (PvdA) was the Mayor of Amsterdam. He was a 
charismatic politician who influenced urban policing a lot. After the terror attacks of 09/11 
and the murder on Theo Van Gogh, Cohen reached out to all religious Moroccan and Muslim 
organizations in an attempt to get them out of isolation, trying to prevent the situation from 
escalating (Vermeulen, 2008). Before his Mayoral position, Cohen had an academic career 
and held various functions in national politics, including Secretary of State on Education as 
well as  Justice. After resigning as Mayor of Amsterdam, he returned to the Dutch parliament 
and became leader of the Labor Party. Mayor Van der Laan (PvdA), presiding the Board of 
Mayor and aldermen, took over and was installed in 2010. He remained Mayor also after the 
2014 elections, where the City Council consisted of 8 different political parties, with the 
Liberal Democrats (D66 - 14 seats), the Labor Party (PvdA - 10 seats), the Liberal Party 
(VVD), the Socialist Party (SP) and the Green Left Wing party (GL - 6 seats) obtained each 6 
seats. Three months of negotiations after the 2014 election between the parties in this hung 
assembly produced a coalition.  The new Board of Mayor and Aldermen in Amsterdam 
consists of the Liberal Democrat Party (D66 - 4 Aldermen), the Liberal Party (VVD - 2 
Aldermen) and the Socialist Party (SP - 2 Aldermen), who together developed and signed the 
coalition Plan called ‘Amsterdam belongs to everyone’. For the first time since World War II 
the Labor Party is no longer part of the Board of Mayor and Aldermen in Amsterdam. Under 
Mayor Van der Laan many projects, plans and approaches for urban policing in Amsterdam 
were introduced with the so called ‘Top600’ anti-crime approach (infra) as his brainchild 
(Nijmeijer and Van Dijk, 2014). Key to his philosophy is that if local government was to 
sanction Amsterdam nightlife when they overstepped their legal boundaries, they should also 
be rewarded when they did adhere to their legal obligations (Blokker, 2015).  
10 
 
 
5.2 The Amsterdam agenda 2014-2018 
 
The Amsterdam agenda is noted in two important documents: the so-called coalition 
agreement 2014-2018 with policy intentions of the Board of Mayor and Aldermen on the one 
hand and the Regional Safety Plan 2015-2018 on the other. As the first is only applicable on 
the metropolises, the Regional Safety Plan covers the Amsterdam-Amstelland region 
including other smaller municipalities mentioned. We analyze both plans in our search for 
dispositions and indicate - if applicable - changes with former plans.  
 
Coalition agreement 2014-2018  
 
The basic tone of this document is creating ‘freedom’ aiming at better housing, better 
regulation of space, better and more education for children, more job opportunities (fighting 
poverty) and less taxes. The overall goal is to foresee in a secure, social and livable city for all 
Amsterdam inhabitants. Extra budgets are foreseen for the fight against poverty, education, 
care, green environment and culture and art. The agreement is differentiated in different 
chapters with special attention of problems of housing28, poverty, bad schooling, care for 
elderly and youngsters and job creation.  
 
Recent research (Van Steden & Broekhuizen, 2015) indicates that Amsterdam-West is among 
the poorest boroughs of Amsterdam. The average total annual income lies approximately 
5,200 euro below the mean of 30,600 euro, and unemployment rates of non-Western migrants 
(circa 11.5 per cent) are generally higher than elsewhere in the city (10.5 per cent). The 
coalition agreement mentions an improvement of policing processes in chapters like 
‘simplifying’ administration, less bureaucracy, less rules, less taxes and an open dialogue with 
the City Council and the opposition, in short: ‘more freedom’ (the title of the agreement).  
 
The coalition agreement foresees in different offers of social care towards the citizen: 22 
neighborhoods are detecting with concentrated need for care. Budgets are also foreseen for 
asylum seekers that are refused, people in need of house-care, medical and social attention 
and early youth care (in collaboration with schools). One of the top priorities is the fight 
against poverty, especially focused on children, striving for a decrease in Amsterdam families 
living in poverty before 2018. This issue needs, according to the Plan, different preventive 
and social measures. A specific Plan was developed to set up in detail the political agenda ‘in 
the social domain29’.  
 
When it comes to safety, stopping hate and racism in the city is prioritized and the Plan refers 
to the main stated goals of the Regional Safety Plan. The coalition mentions the desire for an 
increase of Top 600 to Top 1000 (infra), and a decrease of ‘high impact crimes’ (HIC), as 
well as human trafficking in prostitution. As further explained in the following sections, the 
Coalition Plan demonstrates a combination of prevention, order maintenance and repression 
in an integrated way (with all partners).  In the next paragraph the current policing agenda 
from the Regional Safety Plan 2015-2018 is analyzed. As far as the stated goals differ from 
the Plan (2012-2014) comments will be added.  
 
                                                          
28 In Amsterdam 187.000 households have the right to the ‘social housing’ projects, because they earn less than 
34.700 euro each month, so at least 187.000 social houses have to be offered by the housing companies.   
29 Concept Meerjarenbeleidsplan Sociaal Domein 2015-2018 ‘Alle Amsterdammers doen mee’ Cluster Sociaal, 
16.09.2014.   
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The Regional Safety Plan 2015-2018 
 
The ‘Regional Safety Plan 2014-2018’30 is an outcome of negotiation between the regional 
prosecutor and Mayor, elected government and Board of Aldermen in Amsterdam together 
with the different Mayors, elected governments and Boards of Aldermen in each of the other 
five municipalities in the Amsterdam-Amstelland region. Amsterdam kept its independent 
position from national governance it has always obtained, and this Regional Plan does not 
need the approval of the national police commissioner. The Plan sets out the overarching 
ambition of ‘the improvement of the security within the area through the reduction of crime 
and opportunity’, and is strongly based on the former Regional Plan31 (2012-2014) where 
Mayor Cohen took the lead32. Its overall principle is the so-called ‘integrated approach of 
crime and disorder, where all actors from different policy domains (care, welfare, education, 
housing, employment, crime law enforcement, justice, police..) work together in networking 
governance arrangements and share information of possible offenders of on places at risk.  
The Plan is based on three principles. First of all, crime and insecurity are caused by people, 
so the policy has to focus primarily on the offenders and possible suspects. The focus of the 
Regional Plan lies on the causes of offending behavior: ‘police want to know the offenders 
and offenders have to be aware that police is controlling them’33. Prevention consists -
according to the Plan- of monitoring potential offenders very closely (Van Steden, et al, 2013; 
Boutellier, et al. 2009) with observation techniques, preventive search (identity controls 
searching for illegal weapons) and other control activities like CCTV. The third principle is to 
intervene quickly by means of proportionate punishment immediately after the first offense 
(‘quick justice’). This ‘quick justice’ and prompt punishment approach require close contacts 
and collaboration between government, police and judges (as installed in Amsterdam).  
 
The Regional Safety Plan 2015-2018 mentions nine priorities, which cover the same priorities 
as those set by the former Mayor Job Cohen. The nine priorities are:  
 
1. Top600/Top1000 and high impact crimes (HIC),  
2. Domestic and child abuse,  
3. Intimidation in and around the living areas,  
4. Discrimination including hate crimes,  
5. Radicalization and polarization,  
6. Prostitution (the ‘red light district’ is famous in Amsterdam)  
7. Abuse in human trafficking,  
8. Undermining34, 
9. Surveillance and enforcement priorities (like taxis, housing, fraud in the catering 
industry, manifestations and events, scooters and incivilities).  
 
                                                          
30https://www.amsterdam.nl/wonen-leefomgeving/veiligheid/openbare-orde/veiligheid-cijfers/regionaal/ (Last 
consulted on December 24, 2015) 
31 The first Regional Security Plan was elaborated in 2012 (period 2012-2014).  
32 The only difference with the former Plan is the fact that in the Regional Plan 2015-2018 the rural metropolises 
around Amsterdam negotiated to include a specific priority which is important to them, namely the fight against 
the production of drugs (cannabis) in rural areas. 
33 Conference “Veiligheid in Amsterdam: van gevoel naar feiten” (“Security in Amsterdam: from feelings to 
facts”) on November 20th, 2003.  http://www.ois.amsterdam.nl/pdf/2004_veiligheid_in_amsterdam.pdf (Last 
consulted on January, 9th 2016) 
34 Which is a generic term to indicate all types of crime that ‘undermine’ integrity of local government and the 
quality of life in neighborhoods.  
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On top of these main priorities, other local priorities can find a place, and some extra ‘areas of 
attention’ were added by Mayor Van der Laan, security themes that were not foreseen in the 
former Regional Safety Plan, namely ‘return from custody’, ‘school safety’, ‘foreigners and 
refugees’ and ‘anti-social behavior by youngsters’35. The target groups are recidivist 
youngsters, offenders of domestic violence, addicts (who commit crime), illegal migrants and 
other recidivists. The public police aims to be close to the citizen (community oriented 
policing) in order to detect and intervene in crime and incivility as early as possible. 
Furthermore, the Plan focusses on specific hotspots (based on crime mapping) and certain 
neighborhoods get extra police surveillance. The program Amsterdam was pioneer and is 
spread now around the Netherlands is the ‘Top 600 strategy’. Because of the innovative 
aspect of this program and because of its importance within Amsterdam priorities, we further 
elaborate on this Top 600 strategy.  
 
Top 600 
 
When reflecting on its history, Amsterdam has witnessed the cruel murder of filmmaker and 
writer Theo van Gogh  by a young and radical Muslim in 2004. This attack, along with attack 
a few years before on Dutch politician Pim Fortuyn, acted as a wake-up call for Amsterdam 
regarding terrorism (den Boer, 2007). It was also a trigger for the so-called 600 approach 
which intensified the comprehensive and personalized approach towards finding offenders (de 
Poot & Meershoek, 2014). This Top 600/Top 1000 program became thé flagship program of 
Amsterdam and related to this, the so-called High Impact Crimes (HIC), crimes with huge 
impact on the victim, the environment of the victim and the region as a whole. The focus lies 
on the offence itself as well as on the offender. Within the Top 600 strategy the offences of 
assaults, street robbery, burglaries in stores, serious and public violence and homicide/murder 
are qualified as high impact crimes. Top 600 means 600 offenders of high impact crimes 
known to the police forces and listed. The aim of the Regional Plan 2015-2018 is to broaden 
this registration until 1000 offenders. The program itself not only holds these offenders 
accountable for the crimes they committed through punishment; but also to prevent those 
closely around them (family members, especially siblings) from following their footsteps36. 
Top 600 contains an intensive, integral and target oriented approach aiming at changing 
behavior of those listed. The program objectives are  surveillance, control, investigation, 
aftercare and communication of those involved in HIC. The program consists of three steps 
(Top600 Program Office, 2013):  
 
1. Tit-for-Tat: those apprehended within the program have an expedited court process, which 
should lead to a speed up of the criminal justice process. 
2. Care: a thorough screening of not only the offender, but also their environment. By doing 
so, one finds out what the offender requires in order to prevent re-offending; whether this 
is psychological aid, employment needs, or housing assistance.  
3. Tackling the ‘pathways into crime’ including the influence of other family members in 
promoting, encouraging and compelling offending behaviour? Brothers and sisters are 
observed to ensure school attendance, preventing them from following their family’s 
footsteps.  
 
The priorities and Top 600 goals are to be accomplished not only through the ‘Triangular 
Consultation’ partners including the local governments, the public prosecutor and the public 
                                                          
35 https://www.amsterdam.nl/wonen-leefomgeving/veiligheid/openbare-orde/veiligheid-cijfers/regionaal/ 
36 https://www.amsterdam.nl/wonen-leefomgeving/veiligheid/openbare-orde/aanpak-top600/top600/top600/ (last 
consulted on 6th of April 2016).  
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police, but also through the involvement of mental health institutions, schools, housing 
corporations, psychiatric institutions, childcare, Salvation Army, rehabilitation and probation 
officers, prisons, drug and alcohol addiction self-help groups and insurance companies, 
reassuring those of health insurance when needed. This collaboration is of utmost importance 
to the city and emphasized by Mayor Van der Laan, who has always stressed the importance 
of citizen involvement in the well-being of society (Tonkens & Verhoeven (2011). Over the 
years, the city has witnessed a diversification of providers of policing with a shift in focus 
from reactive measures (traditional law enforcement) to proactive and preventative work 
undertaken to stop those at risk from embarking upon criminal careers. Amsterdam has 
always been at the heart of urban policing in the Netherland and considered one of the pioneer 
in this field. So was the ‘Top 600’ approach copied by multiple big cities (Eindhoven, Utrecht 
and Rotterdam)37 as well as municipalities  of medium size.  
 
Other priorities  
 
In order to get a more complete picture of the Amsterdam dispositions, we elaborate on 
additional priorities important to the metropolis. There is the priority ‘domestic and child 
abuse’ based on ‘different tracks: prevention and information of the citizen, investigation, 
intervening and public prosecution and aftercare. This approach requires a long term 
investment and a systemic integral approach from justice and health care workers, with 
attention to both offender and victim. Central to this multi-actor approach is the ‘Safe Home’ 
project, with a legal task to investigate reports and transfer dossiers to specialists and police 
and justice departments, if necessary. Information gathered in one focal point and 
disseminated towards all actors is again essential. The third priority ‘intimidation in and round 
the living area’ requires, according to the Plan, a coordinated and integrated approach, 
combining criminal justice dispositions with civil procedural ones, administrative measures 
(competence of the Mayor) (infra) and psychosocial interventions. In every neighborhood 
‘information brokers’ are appointed who gather all information on offenders intimidating 
other citizens, examining partner organizations such as housing corporations and the police. 
The problem of ‘radicalisation and polarisation’ became of much more importance in 
Amsterdam since 2005. The approach here is ‘risk-based’, meaning focusing on youngsters at 
risk, aiming at early intervention programs and monitoring, exchanging information with 
police and intervention after an offence is committed. Programs are combining repression, 
care and prevention activities. Partners are, amongst others, the National Coordinator 
counterterrorism and Security, the Security House38 , street corner work, youth protection and 
schools. 
 
Even if not specified as a priority, the fight against vice and drugs markets is important with 
the role of Amsterdam in transnational drug trafficking networks, importing narcotics into 
Europe and then redistributing them to other wholesale centers in other European 
metropolises (UNODC). In tackling drugs as well and other illegal activities of ‘criminal’ 
entrepreneurs an ‘administrative law enforcement approach’ was initiated by the city of 
Amsterdam over a decade ago and is still in place (Nelen and Huisman, 2008, Huisman et al, 
2005). A front runner project was the Emergo-project, launched in 2007, in which the city of 
Amsterdam collaborated with the police, the public prosecutor, and several different 
governmental institutions to fight drugs trade and human trafficking in and around the red 
                                                          
37 The city of Hague did evaluate Top 600 too stigmatizing and believes more in direct social contact with the 
inhabitants of the neighborhood by ‘community officers’. See: http://toezine.nl/artikel/13/top-x-aanpak-is-sexy-
maar-werkt-het-ook/ (last consulted on January 6th 2016).  
38 In Dutch: veiligheidshuis 
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light district (Spapens and Rijken, 2015). By excluding those expected to use legal facilities, 
services and subsidies for illegal activities, the infiltration of criminal networks in the legal 
and economic sectors of local society was hindered (Nelen and Huisman, 2008). Upon today, 
local authorities in Amsterdam as well as throughout the country still create barriers for illegal 
activities by means of local administrative laws. The Board of Mayor and Aldermen 
criminalizes behavior in ‘municipal orders’39 and once these are accepted by the City Council 
the Board can for example close down establishments, suspend licenses and sanction certain 
offences with fines.  
 
5.3 The Amsterdam regime  
 
When analyzing the stated goals and measures in both the Coalition Plan and the Regional 
Safety Plan we see characteristics of mainly two types of policing regimes. First and 
foremost, we discern strong resemblance to a developmental regime which is known for 
leveraging greater corporate investment, like for example the public-private partnerships in 
the Top 600/Top 1000 program. The Regional Plan embraces a risk management approach by 
monitoring potential (young) offenders by means of information exchange between 
professionals, technical observation techniques as CCTV and quick justice - if needed - 
underlines this focus. Moreover, the Top 600 Program is all about managing  risks of 
offending careers, by prevention of the possible causes of crime in an integrated approach of 
all partners combined with  quick criminal justice by police and justice. Secondly, the 
Amsterdam agenda entails components of a transformative regime by seeking to transform 
classical law enforcement through the pursuit of social justice policy agendas entailing 
redistribution of income-and creating equal welfare and housing possibilities in the struggle 
against poverty (Coalition Plan). Both plans illustrate an ‘integrated approach’ where as well 
social justice and welfare goals find a place (coalition Plan) as the management of risky 
individuals (top 600/1000) elaborated on in the Regional (police) Plan. Programs and extra 
budgets for better education, more and qualitative social housing, job opportunities for 
youngsters, programs against hate and racism in the city are oriented towards the social 
disadvantaged, the weaker population of the metropolises and deployed to ‘managing the 
opportunities of crime and disorder’. This is done by taking the so called integral network 
approach between as much partners as possible oriented around the nine priorities. 
Information sharing is the key issue here, as well as working together to decrease the 
problems and prevent crime. This is very interesting because it reasserts a criminal justice 
policy agenda and marginalises risk management (e.g. situational crime prevention) as well as 
social and restorative justice responses to crime and incivility.  
 
6. Urban policing in Rotterdam 
 
Rotterdam is the second largest city in the Netherlands located in the south-western part of the 
country. The metropolis’s history is strongly marked by the Second World War bombings 
destroying the city center as well as the importance of the harbor for local economy and 
employment. Today, local economy expanded with flourishing businesses and financial 
services as well. Rotterdam is a cultural and tourist hotspot in the Netherlands with modern 
architecture, icon bridges and skyscrapers mostly located near banks of the river ‘Maas’. The 
city housed exactly 624.815 inhabitants on the 1st of January 201540. Nearly half of the 
population has a non-Dutch ethnic background and the overall division of income among the 
inhabitants of Rotterdam differs negatively from the national standard (Gemeente Rotterdam, 
                                                          
39 In Dutch: Algemene Plaatselijke Verordeningen  
40 http://statline.cbs.nl/statweb/?LA=nl  (last consulted December 2015) 
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2015). Registered crime rates for Rotterdam show a slight drop during the past 10 years, as in 
many European metropolises41.  
 
6.1 Local Politics and Administration  
 
As a blue collar city, local politics in Rotterdam have been dominated by the Labor Party 
(PvdA) since the Second World War. This changed when a new party called ‘Livable 
Rotterdam’ participated in local elections for the first time and won 17 out of 45 Council seats 
suddenly being the biggest party in 2002. The traditional stable majority for the Labor Party 
in Rotterdam since ended with the ‘monster victory’ of Livable Rotterdam in 2002. Ever 
since, these two political parties have been flipping coins. Either Livable Rotterdam (LR) or 
the Labor Party (PvdA) won elections during the past 10 years and formed a ruling coalition 
with the other parties participating in local elections, including the Liberal Party (VVD), 
Liberal Democrats (D66), Christian Democrats (CDA) or the Green Left Party (GL).  
 
The year 2002 was a turbulent year in both local and national politics. That year front runner 
of the new ‘Livable Rotterdam Party’, Pim Fortuyn, erected a national party called ‘Livable 
Netherlands’ and won seats in national parliament. Shortly after having political success in 
national elections as well, Fortuyn was murdered by an environment activist. These events are 
considered a tipping point in national as well as local politics in Rotterdam.  
 
The surprising election result of 2002 was understood as an expression of the Rotterdam 
people’s dissatisfaction with a decrease of social cohesion due to crime, tensions caused by 
substantive migration and decreasing quality of life in the city’s many neighborhoods (van 
Praag, 2003). The new party ‘Livable Rotterdam’ strategically embraced the public 
dissatisfaction during their election campaign and appointed crime and public safety as one of 
the five key topics in the 2002 coalition agreement titled ‘The new spirit of Rotterdam’ (Van 
Ostaaijen, 2010). This can be seen as a defining moment when crime and urban safety became 
key topics in local politics and policies in Rotterdam. A period characterized by ad hoc 
projects addressing various issues popping up in the city came to an end and was replaced by 
a systematic approach aligning the Mayor, the police and the Public Prosecutor with many 
professionals and citizens contributing to a safer city (Tops, 2007). More specifically, it led to 
the creation of long term policies for urban policing named Five Year Action Plans 
structuring urban policing in Rotterdam until today.  These ‘Five Year Action Programs’ have 
a distinct and threefold policy strategy of 1) neighborhood oriented, 2) person oriented, 3) 
phenomenon oriented policing, complemented with the overall ambition of structured and 
result oriented policy steering with transparent and measurable outputs (Marks and van Sluis, 
2012). In the next paragraphs we will further unravel the dispositions for urban policing of the 
current and previous Five Year Action Programs’ in Rotterdam: ‘Faith in the City’ (2010-
2014) and ‘Safe 010’ (2014-2018) as well as the overarching Coalition Plans in which the 
Board of Mayor and Aldermen set out their objectives and measures on all policy domains. 
Thereafter, in the concluding section, we will compare the Amsterdam and Rotterdam regime. 
 
6.2 The Rotterdam Agenda 2010-2014   
 
After local elections in 2010 both the Labor Party and Livable Rotterdam won an equal 
amount of seats in the City Council. After negotiations about the composition of the new 
ruling coalition Labor Party got in and Livable Rotterdam ended up in the opposition. The 
                                                          
41 http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Crime_statistics (last consulted on January 6th 
2016).  
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new Board of Mayor and Aldermen consisted of the Labor Party (PvdA - 3 Aldermen), the 
Liberal Party (VVD - 2 Aldermen), the Liberal Democrat Party (D66 - 2 Aldermen-D66) and 
the Christian Democrats (CDA - 1 Alderman) and was presided by Mayor Ahmed Aboutaleb 
(PvdA), who has been the Mayor of Rotterdam since 2009. As explained later, shifts in the 
composition of the Board of Mayor and Aldermen affected fundamental aspects in urban 
policing in Rotterdam.   
 
The same holds for the background, career paths and professional networks of the mayor. 
Mayor Ahmed Aboutaleb is a Dutch citizen from Moroccan decent who held various 
positions in national and local polices and administration. Before he was installed as the 
Mayor of Rotterdam in 2009 he was Secretary of State dealing with social welfare and labor 
market (2007-2009). Before he was an Aldermen for the Labor Party in Amsterdam. 
Aboutaleb is often seen as the ‘migrant face’ of the Labor Party and has strong ideas about 
integration of migrants in Dutch society. As an Alderman in Amsterdam he attempted to bring 
clashing groups in local society together after the murder on Van Gogh and proposed to 
abolish state allowances for females refusing to take off their Burka during a job interview. 
As the Mayor of Rotterdam he took a strong stance after the attacks in Paris 2015 by stating 
that ISIS must be eradicated accompanied by the statements that those who do not respect the 
values and norms of western society must leave and that Muslims must distance themselves 
from religious violence. 
 
The Board of Mayor and Aldermen presided by Mayor Aboutaleb from 2010-2014 announced 
their overall plans for the years to come in a Coalition Plan titled ‘Working on Talent and 
Entrepreneurship’ (Gemeente Rotterdam, 2010a). The Board declared to invest in the talents 
of inhabitants by facilitating education, work and sports as well as by boosting local economy 
and entrepreneurship. In contrast to the previous ruling coalitions in Rotterdam, this one 
explicitly decided not to make urban safety a key priority. While they promised to continue 
previous investments and programs in urban safety the Board opted for labor market, 
economy and sustainability as key priorities for 2010-2014. Nevertheless, the board 
acknowledged the importance of urban policing in their coalition program by stating “the 
current level of urban safety is a result of a strict safety agenda during the past ten years. 
This agenda will be continued by implementing the Five Year Action Plan 2010-2014” 
(Rotterdam, 2010: 23 – translation RP). In order to make that happen, local priories and 
strategies for urban safety were described in a separate Security Plan titled ‘Trust in Security’ 
(Gemeente Rotterdam, 2010b). As explained below, this plan largely contained a mixture of 
law enforcement combined with investments in the social-economic sphere and physical 
environment.    
 
Trust  in Security 
 
The five year action program was titled ‘Faith in the City’ described the overall ambitions, 
priorities and strategies for the years 2010-2014 and can be summarized in the bold objective 
to realize that Rotterdam no longer has unsafe neighborhoods in 2014. The plan was derived 
from a consultation round during which local authorities asked households, local 
entrepreneurs and professionals in urban policing about their wishes and demands. The plan 
was also shaped by the need to prioritize and make clear decisions due to limited resources 
during the economic crisis.  This led to the following strategy in terms of neighborhood-, 
person- and phenomenon oriented policing.  
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First of all, the program appoints several neighborhoods scoring highest on crime and lowest 
subjective safety to be addressed by a mixture of social-economic and infrastructural 
investments. By investing in the financial and intellectual capacity of their citizens the Board 
of Mayor and Aldermen explicitly addressed the fact that Rotterdam is a relatively ‘poor 
metropolises’, housing many people with a low income, a lower level of education of which 
many are unemployed. The Board strongly believed in boosting knowledge and skills of 
specific groups of the Rotterdam population as a way to fundamentally invest in a safer city. 
Moreover, following the logic of broken windows (Wilson and Kelling, 1982), the Board 
addressed the infrastructural quality of local neighborhoods by investing in the quality of 
housing, public squares and cleaning up dark allies. In some neighborhoods these investments 
were partly financed by national government who identified 23 neighborhoods in the county, 
7 in Rotterdam, to be regenerated. The decision to opt for social-economic and infrastructural 
investments as means to increase local security have been made on city level and within the 
policy domain of public order and safety. Further research is needed to explore whether or not 
these decisions are aligned with budgets and priorities in other policy domains (housing, 
welfare, labour market) and whether or not they have any criminogenic consequences as 
pointed out by the Copenhagen School.  
 
Secondly, violence, nuisance and crimes undermining society were prioritized as key 
phenomena for urban policing between 2010 and 2014. First of all, severe manifestations of 
drugs related violence, domestic violence and hooliganism were addressed by as well 
administrative policing strategies as by law enforcement. Examples are temporal home 
restrictions given to perpetrators of domestic violence by the Mayor and sanctions for 
individuals who violently attacked public providers of policing by the prosecutor. However, 
the Board hoped to use these rather repressive and reactive sanctions as a last resort and 
therefore deployed a wide variety of preventative interventions and programs. These ranged 
from social interventions such as mediation between perpetrator and victim in order to prevent 
recidivism and more techno-situational l measures such as installing surveillance cameras 
around soccer stadiums. The same holds for youth and drugs related nuisances in the public 
domain as a second phenomenon to be addressed. The plan revealed a range of repressive and 
preventative measures including public sanctions in order to lower the individual’s street 
credibility as well as programs aiming at keeping pupils in school. Thirdly, the phenomenon 
of crimes undermining local society refers to illegal behavior including money laundering, 
human trafficking and real estate fraud proven to disturb local societies and undermining 
integrity of local government. The Board stated to systematically screen for and fight against 
these crimes by addressing at least one criminal network and clearing at least one drugs 
laboratory a year. Measures listed range from monitoring money transaction to tightening 
criteria for exploitation of soft drugs and enforcing these.  
 
Thirdly, but more implicitly, the five year action plan mentioned specific groups and 
individuals as a focal points in urban policing. These included youngsters or recidivists 
causing various forms of violence and nuisance as well a specific risk groups of people 
potentially ending up committing these crimes and disturbing public order. These individuals 
were addressed by means of personal programs to alter behavior including probation and 
internships. Especially youngsters from Moroccan and Antillean decent were screened for 
alarming behavior and are addressed by means of investments in their living environment, 
schooling and family. 
 
Overall, dispositions of the Rotterdam agenda between 2010-2014 can be qualified as a 
mixture between a maintenance and a transformative regime because of respectively the 
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enforcement of administrative and criminal law given the strong emphasis on social-economic 
investments. The five year action plan 2010-2014 is characterized by a mixture of law 
enforcement and targeted investments in individuals and groups as well as boosting social, 
physical and economical spheres of the city. The latter are deemed as necessary in order to get 
to the root causes of crime and disorder in the city. The Board believed that a weighted 
combination of repressive reactions (when needed) and prevention by investing in quality of 
life (when possible) was the best strategy to maintain a safe city. Repressive measures 
included: increasing the number of local wardens with power to enforce administrative laws 
and the local adoption of new powers for Dutch Mayors to carry out preventative measures, 
area restrictions and reporting duties. Preventative elements included: the personal and group 
programs providing care and increasing skills (provided by, for example, social intervention 
teams and street coaches) focusing on youth and families.   
 
6.3 The Rotterdam Agenda 2014-2018  
 
The current Board of Mayor and Aldermen consists of Mayor Ahmed Aboutaleb (PvdA) of 
Livable Rotterdam (3 Aldermen), Social Democrats (2 Aldermen) and the Christian 
Democrats (1 Alderman). This time the Livable Party defeated Labor Party during local 
elections which clearly affected the priorities in the Coalition Plan and Local Security Plan. In 
their Coalition Plan titled ‘Kendoe’42 the Board stated five core ambitions; 1) a safe, joyful 
and green city, 2) investing in the Southern part of the city, 3) creating chances in the labor 
market, 4) boosting economy and labor market in the harbor and 5) investing in social 
cohesion (Gemeente Rotterdam, 2014a). The current Coalition Plan can be distinguished from 
the previous one when it comes to the explicit prioritization of urban policing. A safe city is 
the first key priority of the current Board who presented their agenda for urban policing in a 
separate five year action plan titled ‘Safe 010’. The striking return of urban safety as a key 
priority might be explained by the fact that the Livable Party joined the Board of Mayor and 
Aldermen in 2014. This party always had a strong focus on urban safety and promoted a 
rather tough approach of law enforcement clearly mirrored in the new five year action plan. 
Moreover, Mayor Aboutaleb left room for this as he partly shared his task of taking care of f 
urban safety with an Aldermen representing the Livable Party. This is an exceptional move as 
Mayor Aboutaleb is still individually held accountable by the City Council and public at large 
when it comes to urban policing. Dutch Mayors are formally held responsible for public order 
and public safety and therefore usually do not wish to share policy actions on this topic with 
others in order to keep urban safety policies completely under their span of control.  
 
Safe 010 
 
The current program is titled ‘Safe 010’43 and is the fourth edition in a series of Five Year 
Action Programs and describes the overall ambitions, priorities and strategies for the years 
2014-2018. Within this program the Board of Mayor and Aldermen formulated the 
straightforward ambition to make sure that “Rotterdam has no unsafe neighborhoods and that 
inhabitants, entrepreneurs and visitors feel safe” (Gemeente Rotterdam, 2014b: 5 - translation 
RP)’. The current agenda was, again, derived from a consultation round during which local 
authorities asked inhabitants, local entrepreneurs, academics and professionals in urban 
policing about their priorities for the next five years. Mayor Aboutaleb described the strategy 
underlying the current agenda for urban policing as focusing on “more than just crime” and 
”providing help when possible and being tough when needed” (Gemeente Rotterdam, 2014b: 
                                                          
42 ‘Kendoe’ is slang for ‘Can do’. 
43 010 is the area code of Rotterdam phone numbers and often used as a symbol promoting the city.   
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3 - translation RP). The Board of Mayor and Aldermen explicitly chose to continue the 
strategy of neighborhood-oriented, person-oriented and phenomenon-oriented policing as 
further explained in the following sections. 
 
First of all, the Board announced increased investment in specific neighborhoods with 
relatively high scores on crime and social disorder. The Board addressed these neighborhoods 
by investing in social and physical aspects, this time combined with a strong emphasis on law 
enforcement. The emphasis lied on public wardens in neighborhoods and public 
transportation who ‘act fiercely if needed’ (Gemeente Rotterdam, 2014a). The new Aldermen 
partly responsible for public safety introduced intervention teams fighting nuisance in 
residential areas and build container homes in a remote area near the local airport where 
inhabitants terrorizing their neighbors could be forced to live temporarily. Furthermore, local 
government attempted to take ‘signals and complaints’ from citizens as input when setting the 
agenda and explicitly activates representatives from local society to participate in daily 
practices of urban policing. This is, for example, supposed to happen during meetings in 
which the Mayor, Aldermen, police chief and public prosecutor engage in conversations with 
inhabitants and local entrepreneurs. Together they come to an agreement on how to deal with 
pressing problems which have to be solved by professionals and citizens before the next 
meeting. These programs are called ‘Neighborhood Governs’ and ‘Neighborhood Safety 
Steering Group’ and mirror the involvement of citizens as agenda setters and co-producers of 
public policing.  
 
Secondly, the Board of Mayor and Aldermen prioritized two types of current and unwanted 
phenomena in local society. These included so called ‘high impact crimes’ presumed to have 
a devastating impact on the lives of victims, such as burglary, robbery and theft from the 
person. The new and strong focus on these phenomena might partially be explained by the 
fact that high impact crimes are a key priority of the national police force and that Mayor 
Aboutaleb is leading a national Taskforce aiming to reduce the number of burglaries and 
street robberies since 2009. The local action plan on these topics described performance 
agreements between local government, police and public prosecutor to solve at least 40% of 
all thefts from the persons, raise the probability of catching those committing high impact 
crimes with 37,5% and solve at least 15% of all burglaries (Gemeente Rotterdam, 2014b). 
These rather reactive measures were combined with home visits to roughly 600 perpetrators 
of high impact crimes by civil servants, parole officers and police officers. These visits, partly 
similar to the strategy of the Amsterdam Top 600 approach, aimed to keep an eye on the 
perpetrators as well as on their siblings in order to prevent both from taking a criminal path.  
 
Another prioritized phenomenon focuses on somewhat invisible but illegal behavior 
‘undermining societal integrity’. This priority refers to illegal behavior including money 
laundering, human trafficking drugs trade and cybercrime, proven to disturb local societies 
and undermining integrity of local government. Local government aimed to prevent ties 
between legal and illegal infrastructures in local society dealing with these phenomena and 
make sure they do not unintentionally facilitate illegal behavior. A key instrument for 
addressing this type of crime for local government is the BIBOB44 law allowing to screen 
applicants for permits and subsidies on criminal records. Moreover local government actively 
engaged in partnerships with the police, the public prosecutor and others to share information 
and pool manpower and instruments to prevent and sanction crimes undermining society.  
 
                                                          
44 Wet bevordering integriteitsbeoordelingen door het openbaar bestuur 
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Thirdly, specific individuals and groups stand high on the current policy agenda for urban 
policing in Rotterdam. The current action plan strongly focuses on ‘risks groups’. These are 
people considered to hold vulnerable positions in society, such as minorities, individuals 
suffering from mental health problems, labor immigrant from Mid- and Eastern Europe and 
homeless people. Also individual and groups engaged in all sorts of criminal behavior were 
appointed as risk groups as well as individuals showing signs of radicalization potentially 
leading to terrorist activities targeted for public intervention. It was the Board’s ambition to 
disturb and punish illegal behavior but their main focus lies on a preventative, networked 
approach of these individual and groups. Local government aimed to activate and facilitate 
professionals, including the police, social workers and youth care, to pool information and 
resources in order to recognize these risk groups and deploy measures focused on changing 
behavior and minimalizing factors stimulating criminal activities.  
 
Overall, the action plan 2014-2018 prioritized phenomena, persons and neighborhoods to be 
addressed by means of a “balanced mixture of prevention and repression” (Gemeente 
Rotterdam, 2014b: 5-translation RP). Again a distinction was made between ‘social measures’ 
investing in the quality of life of individuals or groups in order to prevent unwanted behavior 
and ‘physical measures’ boosting the quality of public space inspired by the broken window 
idea. Local government opted for such preventive measures investing in people and public 
space while promising to ‘act fiercely’ when rules are violated. The latter element of 
enforcing mostly administrative law is stronger in comparison to the previous action plan. 
Also the emphasis of identifying specific risk groups and making them a core action in public 
policing is much more explicit in this current program. In terms of regime theory, 
Rotterdam’s policy agenda for public policing could be qualified as a mixture of at least three 
regimes. The emphasis on enforcing administrative law mirrors a key component of a 
maintenance regime while the plan also shows elements of a developmental regime due to the 
stronger focus on risk groups and flings with the idea of a transformative regime by making 
social and physical investments in the city a genuine part of urban policing. All in all, the 
local agenda leans most towards a maintenance regime as security reappeared on the 
Coalition’s list of priorities, the overall strategy of neighborhood and phenomena and 
individual and group oriented policing still characterized the local agenda, be it with a 
stronger emphasis enforcing administrative law instead of social-economic investments this 
time.  
 
6.4 The Rotterdam regime 
 
As indicated in the previous sections the Rotterdam agenda for urban policing shows elements 
of a maintenance and transformative regime (2010-2014 + 2014-2018) as well as a 
developmental regime (2014-2018). While both the current and previous Board upheld the 
policy tradition of designing agendas for public policing along the lines of neighborhood, 
person- and phenomena oriented policing the previous action plan leans slightly more to a 
transformative regime whereas the current one leans a bit more to a maintenance regime. The 
main difference lies in the fact that the previous Board deviated from their predecessor by not 
making local security a key priority in their Coalition Plan and focusing strongly on investing 
in social, economic and physical spheres in order to create a safer city, whereas the current 
Board of Mayor and Aldermen favored a more traditional approach marked by maintaining 
administrative laws as their primary response to crime and disorder which re-appeared as a 
priority in their Coalition Plan.  
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We observed that local politics partly shaped the urban regimes for public policing in 
Rotterdam. It is the Board of Mayor and Aldermen who sets the scene in their Coalition Plans 
and Five Year Action Plans. Once the composition of the Board changed in terms of political 
parties and thus political stances on urban policing regime changed as well.  The fact that 
urban safety shifted from one of many points of interest in the years 2010-2014 to a key 
priority between 2014-2018 can partially be explained by the Livable party joining the Board 
of Mayor and Aldermen pushing their core topic of safety back on the agenda. In fact, the 
stronger emphasis on law enforcement promoted by Livable Rotterdam Party delivering an 
Aldermen responsible for Safety, Enforcement and Public Space clearly shifted the precarious 
balance from a dominant transformative to a maintenance regime. This resembles other 
studies demonstrating that the Livable Party was indeed able to institutionalize their 
preferences on urban policing into policies and practices (Van Ostaaijen, 2010).   
 
Apart from local politics there are many interlinkages to be observed between local and 
national circuits of power shaping the agenda for urban policing in Rotterdam. First of all, the 
current policy agenda for urban policing in Rotterdam, like in Amsterdam, addresses a 
mixture of nationally and locally defined issues. Roughly half of the local priorities stated in 
the current Five Year Action Plan match national priorities for public policing45, namely 
youth, high impact crimes, public safety in public spaces and crimes undermining society. 
Secondly, national government provided both money to tackle unsafe neighborhoods as well 
as powers for Dutch Mayors which were adopted in the Rotterdam agenda for public policing 
thereby shaping local policy agendas. Thirdly, Mayor Aboutaleb’s predecessor Ivo Opstelten 
(1999-2008) became Minister of Safety and Justice (2010-2015) and installed the national 
police organization replacing the regional police organization. It is precisely this national 
police organization that now reshuffles local policing structures and priorities in Rotterdam. 
These are the most striking observations when it comes to the connectedness of urban 
policing in Rotterdam with supra local circuits of power.  
 
7. Conclusion: Convergence and divergence in Amsterdam and Rotterdam 
 
As we detected in both metropolises a durable constellation of ‘semi-autonomous’ actors 
supporting and implementing a city-wide policing agenda, we can conclude that in both 
metropolises an urban regime (Stone, 1989, 2005; Mossberger, 2009; Mossberger, et al, 2001) 
is present. An in-depth analysis of policing agendas in both metropolises demonstrates that 
these regimes show elements of divergence. The current Amsterdam agenda primarily shows 
resemblance to the developmental and the transformative regimes, as the Plans touch upon as 
well social justice dispositions as on public-private collaboration (Top 600/Top 1000). The 
current Rotterdam agenda, however, can for a large part be qualified as a maintenance regime 
as it has a strong emphasis on enforcing administrative law. This is combined with a focus on 
risk groups and social and physical investments in the city as genuine part of urban policing 
adding a touch of a developmental and transformative regime to the mix.  
 
A potential explanation for the divergence between both metropolises in terms of urban 
regimes may be that these regimes are partially shaped by political processes on the local and 
regional level. In Rotterdam a change in the composition of the Board of Mayor and 
Aldermen led to institutionalization of alternative strategies for policing. The entrance of the 
Liveable Party in the Rotterdam Board of Mayor and Aldermen clearly led to a stronger focus 
on law enforcement resulting in a stronger emphasis to a maintenance regime.  
                                                          
45 https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/actueel/nieuws/2011/02/18/landelijke-prioriteiten-politie-voor-een-veiliger-
nederland (last consulted on April 4th 2016) 
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Contrastingly, the policing agenda in Amsterdam remained more or less stable, also when –
after the 2014 elections- the composition of the local political coalition was slightly altered. 
Changes in de policing regime regarding the former coalition will, according to expert-
respondents, only become visible when analyzing the actual implementation of the security 
plans, the so called ‘policing in action’.  This level of continuity in the formal policing agenda 
might be explained by the fact that the mayor of Amsterdam presided both the previous and 
current Board of Mayor and Aldermen and remained fully in charge of local security policies. 
In Rotterdam, the mayor also presided over two subsequent Boards however partially 
delegated some local security policies to an Aldermen responsible for Safety, Enforcement 
and Public Space leading to some changes in local strategies for policing.  
 
In the Netherlands, explanations for different regimes could thus be found in the interactions 
and negotiations between all parties in the political arena. This includes the mayors who, as 
we explained earlier, have a rather particular status when it comes to local policing. Although 
Dutch mayors have formal responsibilities and powers when it comes to urban policing, 
divergence of policing regimes cannot be solely explained by their political stance. Mayors 
Van der Laan (Amsterdam) and Aboutaleb (Rotterdam) are affiliated with the Labor Party 
(PvdA). Both had a career in local and national politics making them rather experienced local 
leaders expected to be professional administrators in the Dutch political system of local 
governance. Their professional experience and networks on multiple levels makes them 
influential in shaping local policy agendas as further indicated below.  
 
Besides divergence, policing agendas in Amsterdam and Rotterdam partially show 
convergence in terms of policing priorities. Both metropolises listed high impact crimes, 
forms of organized crime undermining society as well as concerns regarding youth as key 
priorities in the security plans. This could be explained by institutional arrangements in place. 
The national police presented a list of national priorities which both cities adopted in their 
local security plans. The manifestation of convergence in terms of priorities for urban policing 
in both metropolises resemble half of the national priorities. Whether this can be explained as 
the outcome of an actual top down mechanism of national government determining the 
content of local policy plans within the new framework of the national police is subject for 
future research. Previous research shows that under the umbrella of the former regional police 
organisation local authorities only embraced national priorities once deemed present in the 
local setting and solely adopted national instruments once valued useful by local stakeholders 
(Prins, 2014).  
 
One way or the other, Dutch arrangements for prioritizing issues on the urban policing agenda 
tend to encourage convergence, both on local and national level. This type of convergence 
could also be explained in terms of local leaders having close ties to other loci of power 
because of their flourishing careers in many levels of politics and administration in the Dutch 
system. The fact that Mayors of both metropolises have ties to national government makes it 
easier to foster alignment between priorities and strategies for policing between national and 
local levels. This works both ways, as Mayor Aboutaleb is, for example, leading the national 
task force on high impact crimes, it is no surprise that this issue ended up in local security 
plans as well. The other way around we saw local practices of Amsterdam authorities 
experimenting with administrative measures against drugs trade and organized crime and 
elaborating the Top 600 program which both have been embraced by national government and 
were transferred a best practice to many other Dutch municipalities. A final explanatory factor 
for the fact that the metropolises under study are rather converging than diverging in terms of 
23 
 
priorities could be the fact that in Europe public resources from central governments are often 
available for metropolitan development, fostering a similar focus on policing and lessening 
the need for reliance on private-sector finance (Mossberger, et al, 2009) 
 
In conclusion  we are affirmative that the policing agendas leading to “modes of governance” 
(Di Gaetano et al, 1999) in both metropolises under study, can be called ‘regimes’ as they are 
characterized by pre-emptive power and enduring cooperation, recorded officially in the 
‘Coalitions Agreements’ and the Security Plans. Further research should indicate how these 
agendas are implemented and if these regimes stay  stable over time within existing local 
political coalitions.  
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